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In arguing that borders not only should be understood as economic barriers to trade, but also 
as cultural barriers to interaction, this paper attempts to operationalize a broader interpretation of 
borders with regards to economic cross-cultural integration. Thus, by formalizing the cultural 
effects of borders as mental distances (interpreted as social identities), and by using an agent-
based simulation model, I analyze how the border affects, and is itself affected by, economic 
integration. The model is based on two regions separated by a border. Based on expected payoffs 
and mental distance, agents first choose whether to interact at home or to cross the border. Then, 
agents choose their action in a simple PD game based on a general disposition of trust, as well as 
the mental distance should the interaction partner be from across the border. The agent’s mental 
distance and trust level are then updated according to the agent’s experience of the interaction 
(positive or negative). The model generally reveals that underlying cultural processes may affect 
the success of economic integration considerably, and suggests that the success of the integration 
depends significantly (and in asymmetric ways) on mental distances between regions, on 
economically vs. culturally motivated behavior, and on collectivistic vs. individualistic characters 
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computers. 1. Introduction 
The concept of cooperation, and especially how cooperative structures can persist in human 
society, has long been an illusive component of economic theory. Experimental research clearly 
indicates that the behavior of people more often is governed by norms of fairness, equality, and 
other such cultural values, than it is by strict economic self-interest [Fehr and Gächter, 2000a, 
2000b; Henrich, 2000]. Moreover, recent studies show that the degree of influence of such values 
on economic behavior even seem to differ across cultures [Henrich 2000; Henrich et al., 2001], 
and that the way people reason, with respect to economic choices, may depend critically on the 
cultural context to which they belong [Hayashi et al., 1999]. Hence, much evidence points in the 
direction that the economic behavior of people in fact depends on, and is inseparable from, 
peoples’ self-conception – or the way they identify themselves socially. The economic behavior 
of people can therefore be linked to their surrounding environment, their language, and their 
culture. As such, differences with respect to identity related influences on behavior are bound to 
exist across cultures [Ash, 1999; Henrich & Boyd, 1998; Markus & Kitayama, 1991]. Based on 
this idea, it seems reasonable to believe that culture also must play an important role in matters of 
economic cross-cultural interactions and integration. This is due both to the differences in 
meaning and reasoning that may exist between the actors, but also to the following cultural 
confrontations that cross-cultural interaction structures are likely to spark. Hence, this paper 
suggests that culture should take a more important role with respect to the modeling of economic 
cross-cultural, or cross-border, cooperation/integration. More specifically, it attempts linking the 
concept of social identity to a broader understanding of borders, and to analyze how borders in 
this sense can affect processes of economic cross-border integration. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the following (section 2) I link the concepts of social 
identity and mental distances to borders in order to facilitate a broader understanding of borders 
in relation to cross-cultural interaction. Section 3 deals with the operationalization of the cultural 
or mental aspect of the border, i.e. the social identity. In section 4 I attempt to build an 
evolutionary model of economic cross-cultural cooperation and integration, which allows for a 
broader interpretation of borders by including the concept of mental distance (or social identity), 
and how this affects processes of economic cross-border integration. In this connection, I present 
a couple of the most interesting simulation results in section 5, before turning to a more general 
analysis of the model in section 6. Section 7 concludes on the findings. 
 
  12. Borders, Social Identity and Mental Distances 
Research on borders and their economic impacts have revealed that borders have substantial 
negative economic consequences [de Boer, 2001; Houtum, 1999; Rietveld, 2001]. Large 
discontinuities in flow variables are often observed at border crossings, and in this connection 
borders have typically been understood as barriers to trade. Naturally, the boundaries of a 
territory can be limiting in certain ways, for example by hindering free movement of labor or 
other productive factors across the border, but boundaries are important in many other ways. 
Focusing on state borders, for instance, their most essential and primary function is the power 
and capacity they give to exert control over some territory, which can be well illustrated by the 
morally claimed and felt rights to protect and defend one’s own country [Houtum, 2001]. The 
sense of place is therefore strongly connected with the residing population’s social identities and 
their feelings of belonging to their particular territory, implying that borders are important in 
more than an economic sense. For instance, it is well known that people often attach strong social 
meaning to the groups they feel they belong to – even when there seems to be no apparent reason 
for it
1. Moreover, people also show clear signs of sharing similar values, or views of the world, 
within groups. These are all tendencies strongly related to the concept of social identity, which 
can be defined as “…our understanding of who we are and who other people are, and, 
reciprocally, other people’s understanding of themselves and others (which includes us).” 
[Jenkins, 1996: 5]. Hence, other people provide a frame of reference, in which the self is located 
and evaluated [Ziller, 1973]. 
Borders typically also separate places in terms of politics, economics, culture, history, and 
social structures, which effectively means that they often divide entire systems of socialization. 
The process of socialization, however, is what produces and reproduces social identities, and in 
this sense borders function in yet another important way. They make sense to people by 
producing common points of reference to which individuals can relate themselves, for instance, 
as being a part of a certain culture. Thus, borders function as the most apparent apparatus for 
making sense of the ‘outside’ world as they feed into the social identity of people by establishing 
shared values, such as collective images, ideas, and feelings of belonging, relative to the values 
that exist on the other side of the border (i.e. see Houtum, [1999], Paasi [2000]). The cultural 
                                                 
1 For examples of this please refer to Hayashi et al. [1999] or Kuran [1998]. One example includes the grouping of 
people according to favorite painters, or their tendency to over- or underestimate the number of small dots on a 
screen. Nevertheless, despite these rather trivial grouping methods, people still seem to attach meanings to the group 
they themselves belong to by favoring members of their own group. 
  2aspect of the border is therefore always relative to what is on the other side of it [Barth, 1995], 
which implies it may be represented as cultural or mental distances. Hence, borders are 
meaningful devices as they play an important role in how people understand themselves, and the 
world around them. Because of this, borders are not necessarily located on the physical border 
lines but everywhere in the society and can therefore be based on various institutions such as 
diverging social practices, languages and discourses [Paasi, 2000]. In this way, borders can be 
interpreted as institutions in themselves, which may explain a country’s often very persistent 
collective images such as the ‘typical Swede’ or the ‘typical Dane’, and the following mental 
division across places.  
Based on the discussion above, there seem to be more to borders than simple barriers to 
economic trade. Indeed, borders may represent a vast array of cultural aspects which may be 
important for economic cross-border (CB) cooperation and integration. For instance, in a study 
on the determinants of economic CB relationships of small and medium sized companies in 
border regions comprising parts of Belgium and the Netherlands, Houtum [1999, 2001] found 
that people’s mental distance towards the other side, as well as their perception of the border’s 
symbolic value, affected the number of such relationships significantly and in a negative fashion
2. 
In this sense, interpreting borders merely as physical dividers of space seems inadequate 
concerning matters of economic CB cooperation and integration. 
 
3. Operationalizing the Concept of Social Identity 
In recent years the body of literature seeking to include concepts of culture and psychology 
into economic theory has expanded significantly, see i.e. Bowles [2002], Bowles & Gintis, [1998, 
2000, 2002], Boyd & Richerson [2001], Epstein [2000], Epstein & Axtell [1996], Gil-White & 
Richerson [2002], Henrich & Boyd [1998, 2002], McElreath et al. [2003] and Rabin [1993]. The 
trend of modeling culture seems especially strong with respect to social evolutionary theory and 
the modeling of complex systems
3. 
                                                 
2 Houtum [1999: 123] defines mental distance as “the estimation by entrepreneurs of the differences and the 
consequences of these differences in formal and informal business conventions between a foreign country and the 
home country.” where “business conventions” are defined as “socio-economic conditions for doing business, socio-
cultural conditions (including language), and legal-administrative preconditions” following Storper [1997]. 
3 Due to the often interdisciplinary nature of research in this field, and the lack of a general methodology in the area, 
it can be hard to relate contributions (and their various interpretations of employed cultural concepts) to each other. 
In this connection, the need of a general methodological foundation has been advocated by several researchers, 
[Goldspink, 2002; Klüver et al., 2003]. A more detailed account on existing research has therefore been left out of 
this paper. 
  3Following Hofstede [1980], I define culture as ‘the collective programming of the mind’, 
implying that all human beings have some kind of mental program, or mental map, which guide 
our beliefs, understandings, and our behavior through a set of acquired values. These values may 
be acquired genetically or socially. The mental map can be summarized as having three parts: a 
universal part, a collective part, and an individual part. The universal part represents values 
shared on a universal level, which could be values related to feelings of pain and pleasure. The 
collective part represents values shared on a collective level, which could be a shared set of 
norms, rules, beliefs, etc. within a group of people. The individual part represents the values that 
are unique to a person such as this individual’s unique history of actions and experiences. 
Whereas both the collective and the individual part reflect values that are socially learned, the 
universal part does not. Hence, if a person belongs to a specific cultural group it means that this 
person shares a certain set of values collectively with other members of this group. Different 
groups can therefore be represented by differences in collectively held values across individuals. 
Since the process of socialization within a group often means a tendency for convergence in 
collectively held values, although individual members may hold values different from each other, 
the mental map offers a good way of operationalizing the concept of social identity. In this 
connection, and since this paper is concerned with cross-cultural interactions, I narrow the 
concept of social identity to the individual’s identity towards people from the bordering culture. 
Hence, social identity here refers to the person’s understanding of himself, from an individual 
point of view (the individual part), or from the point of view of the group he belongs to (the 
collective part), in relation to the people belonging to the bordering group. In this way, the social 
identity may also be interpreted as the person’s mental distance to the bordering culture, which in 
this case consists of his individual mental distance as well as the distance shared collectively. 
In the following model I have drawn on several contributions, but with special emphasis on 
those related to emerging and sustained cultural differences and cross-cultural economic 
interaction models. Models of this form are therefore nothing new, however, models of individual 
inter-group interaction have often been based on exogenously given probabilities for places of 
interaction (i.e. Bowles & Gintis [2000]), whereas models of cross-group cooperation and 
conflicts typically has been modeled by reducing (or aggregating) such confrontations to the level 
of entire cultural groups such as “wars” in Bowles [2001]. Concerning exiting models dealing 
more explicitly with the concept of social identity, such as Akerlof and Kranton [2000], Doran 
[1998], Lustick [2000] and van der Veen [2002], these often appear with no economic aspects, or 
  4outside a cross-cultural interaction framework. Hence, most models have paid no attention to the 
evolution of cross-cultural effects in terms of the agents’ social attachment to groups, and the 
cultural distances between groups. The following model, is therefore an attempt to deal with the 
question of how cultural asymmetries between regional places (interpreted as cultural or mental 
distances), play out their roles in the case of economic cooperation between culturally separated 
spaces, and how these two parts (cultural distances and economic cooperation) co-evolve over 
time. The model is therefore to be seen as an early and humble attempt of taking the first steps in 
this direction  
 
4. The Model 
The general idea of the model is this: People who belong to different systems of socialization 
are, due to differences in collectively shared values, culturally programmed, through their 
socially derived identities, to exhibit differences in mental and behavioral patterns across 
socialization systems. In this context, I consider two bordering regions, A and B populated by nA 
and nB agents (respectively). I assume that A and B are separated by a state border, thereby 
making the combined area a potential cross-border region. As argued, culture can be seen as a 
relative concept and is measured as a sort of cultural or mental distance from A to B. Because of 
culture’s relativity, however, the mental distance from A to B does not necessarily correspond to 
the mental distance from B to A, and this must be seen as a novel idea in the field of evolutionary 
models on culture. Agents must first decide to interact locally, or to cross the border. Wherever 
they choose to interact they play a PD game with a randomly chosen partner, but games differ in 
payoff structure according to the place of interaction. In the choice of where to interact, agents 
are influenced economically by differences in regional payoffs, and culturally by the mental 
distance towards the bordering region. The agent’s mental distance is determined according to the 
region’s degree of being culturally collectivistic vs. individualistic. When faced with the choices 
of the PD game, agents determine their behavior according to their general level of trust relative 
to a threshold of cooperation, and if agents are passively engaged by members of another region 
than their own, they adjust their threshold according to their mental distance. Any economic 
interaction leads to a social experience, causing the agents to update their level of trust as well as 
their mental distance, should they interact with a member the neighboring region  
 
 
  54.1. Local Interaction 
 
4.1.1. The Economics of the Local Game 
Let us start simply by considering the interaction structure within each region. I assume that 
an agent is picked randomly from the regional population. Initially, there is no possibility of CB 
interaction, and therefore the agent simply chooses to interact locally (meaning in his own 
region). By doing so, a local interaction partner is randomly assigned to the agent, and when the 
two agents have been paired, they must decide what action to take in a simple PD with no option 
to exit. 
 
4.1.2. General Trust 
Each agent is equipped with a general disposition of trust in others, which I will call general 
trust
4, and denote ti. I look at trust, ti, as what reflects agent i’s general willingness to engage in 
cooperative behavior with other agents. Since the concept of trust reflects the general 
willingness, it is not bound by cultural biases. This is likely to be a critical assumption 
concerning cross-cultural interactions, but there are ways of taking trust’s dependency on culture 
into account, which I will turn to later. For now, however, trust is only to be seen as an aspect of 
one single region. 
I formalize trust by letting   and assume that the more trusting an agent is, the 
higher is t. Thus, t = 0 reflects a non-trusting individual
[0;1), i t ∈ i ∀
5. Each agent’s level of trust is assumed 
to be a product of the agent’s individual experiences, where an agent’s experience, denoted xi, 
can either be negative or positive, such that  { 1,1} i x ∈ − . Negative and positive experiences relate 
to the outcomes of the agent’s social interactions. For instance, if agent i experiences a positive 
outcome of an interaction he increases his level of trust, and if he experiences a negative outcome 
he decreases his level of trust. In this connection I assume that that xi=1 whenever a partner j 
cooperates, and that xi = –1 whenever a partner j defects. Trust is updated as follows. 
, max min
,1 , m a x
()
1









⎡ ⎤ ∆− ∆
=+ ∆ − + ⎜⎟ ⎢ ⎥ − ⎣ ⎦ ⎝⎠
     (1) 
                                                 
4 Just as culture, trust is a very fuzzy concept, and knowing that trust can cover several different meanings such as 
basic trust, generalized trust, situational trust, etc. [see i.e. Uslaner, 2002; Marsh, 1994]. 
5 Other ways of formalizing trust typically let  [1 ; 1 ) t ∈ − , i.e. see Marsh [1994], to reflect that trust can be negative 
(i.e. such as distrust). In this model, however, trust is to be seen relative to the cooperative threshold, and may 
therefore reflect the same range of trust. 
  6The change in ti equals   (the maximum rate of change) adjusted according to the agent’s 
trust level in relation to the average trust in the region of which i is a member. For instance, if 
agent i’s experience is positive (x
max t ∆
i = 1) there is a tendency for increments to be bigger (smaller) if 
agent i’s trust level is below (above) the average trust. The parameters  max t ∆  and   denote the 
maximum and minimum constraints put onto the increase in t
min t ∆
i, and max( ) tt −  denote the 
maximum distance between individual trust and average regional trust. Hence, within a given 
society trust building is slow, but so is trust breaking
6. 
 
4.1.3. Local Threshold of Cooperation 
As already mentioned, the more trusting an individual is, the higher is the individual’s degree 
of willingness to cooperate. This basically means that a high level of trust can be seen as a high 
willingness to risk the potential cost of engaging in the cooperative behavior. It is therefore clear 
that trust, as stated above, must be seen relative to the risk of cooperation. In order to 
operationalize the formal concept of trust, I therefore model the risk of cooperation as a 
cooperation threshold such that the agent’s probability of cooperation is higher the higher trust is 
relative to the threshold [Macy, 1991; Marsh, 1994]. In this connection, it seems reasonable that 
the higher the expected gain to defection (which naturally reflects the risk of cooperation), the 
higher a level trust is required to still induce the cooperative action. Hence, suppose that the 
fraction of cooperating agents in a given region is given by fC then the expected gain of defecting 
on a fellow individual is given by 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) DC EE D E C f b a c d d a π =−= + − − + −  
Because of the payoff structure the expected gain to defection is always positive (Defection is the 
dominant strategy), and given the additional assumption that b + a > c + d it is also increasing 
with the overall fraction of cooperators. Thus, as more and more agents cooperate the economic 
                                                 
6 This way of formalizing trust implies that there is a tendency to move faster towards, and slower away from the 
group average. The actual change in an agent’s level of trust therefore depends on the distance between the agent’s 
individual level of trust and the collective (as in regional) level of trust. This is meant to take into account the 
presumed ‘stickiness’ of societal trust due to societal conformity with respect to shared societal values. Since trust 
may reflect an underlying commonality of values [Uslaner, 2002], one can in this connection say that the average 
level of trust, here interpreted as the general trust in a given society, may reflect the believed (or felt) commonality of 
values held within this society. This implies that changing one’s level of trust too much above or below the societal 
average (despite a clear positive or negative experience) not only may be unwise from a rational point of view, 
because it could be individually costly (i.e. in terms of social punishment). Indeed, it may also hold within it a 
‘break’ with collectively shared values within the society, and such a break may be socially unwanted even with 
respect to the individual herself. This is a point also emphasized by Akerlof and Kranton [2000]. 
  7incentive for defecting on a fellow individual increases
7. Therefore, for cooperation to be 
sustained, a higher level of trust is needed. We note that  () [ ; D ] E da bc π ∈ −− , and from this I 











  such that  ( ) [0,1] C gf ∈      (2) 
This may seem overly simple, but it suffices for the purpose. Basically it reflects that as the 
fraction of cooperators increase, so does the potential payoff to defection (and thereby the risk of 
cooperating), which implies that a higher degree of trust is needed to sustain cooperative action
8. 









       ( 3 )  
The parameter S is a slope parameter controlling how fast the probability of cooperation rises or 
falls relative to the distance between trust and the threshold of cooperation. If t is equal to the 
cooperation threshold, g, then the probability of cooperation equals one half. If trust increases 
relative to g then the probability of cooperation also increases, whereas if t decreases relative to g 
the probability decreases. In relation to the trust update function, this way of formalizing the 
choice of cooperation implies that there is a built-in tendency in the model (where the strength 
depends on S) for moving towards either a high trusting, and therefore a ‘cooperative’, society or 
towards a low trusting, and therefore ‘defectionist’, society. This enables analyses on how CB 
interactions between high trusting and low trusting societies will affect the interaction structure 
and the process of integration.  
 
4.2. Cross-Border Interaction 
Initially, the border separating A and B is closed. Thus, all agents have no other choice than to 
engage in local economic activity. However, once the border opens, agents are given the 
possibility to engage in economic interaction across the border instead of locally. What is novel is 
the fact that the agent’s individual choice of where to interact not only depends on the expected 
economic payoffs (modeled by regional averages), but also on the agent’s social identity, or what 
can be thought of as the agent’s social attachment to the region he belongs to. This establishes the 
model’s link to the concept of mental distance, and separates it from most other models of inter-
                                                 
7 This need not be the case, however, in order to take this effect into consideration I will assume that this is the case. 
8 The model was tested to be robust for small variations in the specification of the threshold function.  
  8group interaction. The latter is true also from the perspective that the choice of crossing the 
border is endogenized. Once the choice to cross the border has been made, the agent is paired 
(randomly) with an interaction partner from the other region, and each agent will make the 
decision whether to cooperate or defect, based on rules similar to the local interaction.  
 
4.2.1. The Economics of the Cross-Border Game 
The cross-border game is characterized as a game with potentially higher payoffs to mutual 
cooperation than what can be obtained in each region’s local game. This reflects the potentially 
higher outcomes of cooperative action across borders due to shared opportunities and common 
problems (to which the solution requires mutual cooperative efforts). On the other hand, the 
payoff to unilateral defection is assumed equally high. This is to reflect the existence of interest 
conflicts across regions, lack of coordinating CB structures and higher potentials for exploitation. 
For simplicity, I assume that the payoffs to unilateral cooperation and mutual defection remain 
the same as in the local game. The normal form CB game is given in table 4.2.1. 
 
Table 4.2.1. The Cross-Border Game 
 Cooperate  Defect 
Cooperate  () ; (
AB
LL cv f cv f ++ ) )
  ;(
B
L ab vf +  
Defect  () ;
A
L bv f a +   d ; d 
Note: The function v is explained in the next section 
 
Introducing    in the payoff to mutual cooperation and unilateral defection reflects, as 
already mentioned, the assumption that there are potential economic benefits of cooperating (and 
defecting) across the border. As such, these benefits are not constant but depend on the region’s 
intensity of local interaction denoted by 
(.) 0 v >
k
L f , k = A, B, corresponding to the fraction of agents 
from region k  who  actively choose to interact in their own region. The parameter 
k
L f  may 
therefore also be interpreted as the region’s degree of active economic closedness. In this 
connection, since the economy is open to interactions engaged by agents across the border, 
asymmetries in integration can arise
9.  
                                                 
9 For instance, suppose that all agents in A choose to interact locally. Then, due to the open border all agents in A still 
have the possibility of becoming involved in what I will call ‘passive’ CB interactions with agents from B. An 
extreme case of asymmetry in regional integration therefore arises if all agents in A interact locally, while all agents 
in B cross the border, which corresponds to the situation when  1
A
L f =  and  0
B
L f =  and means that all economic 
activity is concentrated in A. The model therefore enables one to think about integration in more than one respect, 
  94.2.2. Cross-Border Threshold of Cooperation 
The higher the region’s intensity of local interaction,
k
L f , the smaller is the potential CB 
payoff for agents in this region. This is due to the assumption that as the frequency of active CB 
interactions increases, say, from A to B, the better is the regional structure in A in handling such 
interactions (i.e. the region obtains better knowledge, procedures, know-how, etc. in the active 
form of dealing with agents from the other side). This relates to the fact that as the frequency of 
active CB interaction increases, so does the active regional demand for CB linkages [de Boe & 
Hanquet, 1999], which increases the potential benefit of supplying such linkages as well as their 




L f , and to keep 
matters simple that  , where v 10 ()
k




1 > v0 > 0.
10 Hence, given the payoff structure of 
table 4.2.1 the expected gain of defecting in a CB interaction can be written as 
,, () ( ) ( ) ( )
kk k k k
DC B C B C B CC B EE D E C f b a c d π




−  is the fraction of CB cooperators (both active and passive) in the region bordering 
region  k. This implies that  [ ] , () ;
k
DC B Ed a b π c ∈ −−  for bcda − >−, which makes the CB 
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1 ] ∈  
If an agent chooses to interact across the border, the agent knows that he will meet an agent from 
the other side. Hence, ,
A
CC B f
−  should correspond to the fraction of B-agents who actually cooperate 
in CB interactions (either actively or passively). Obviously such a measure is non-existing at the 
time of the border opening since no CB interactions have taken place, and I therefore assume that 
the agents in A will form their initial expectation of  ,
A
CC B f
−  on the overall fraction of cooperators in 
B. This is obviously a poor measure, however, as the border is opened and as the two regions 





L f = where full integration, for instance, only refers to the case where  =  and  . It should also be mentioned, 
that regarding ‘passive’ CB interactions it is assumed that whenever an agent becomes involved in such a situation 
he does not loose his own individual choice of where to interact. In other words, active economic action is not 
conditioned on whether the agent is picked as an interaction partner or not. This is also assumed to be the case in the 
local economy. 
10 Thus, v1 reflects the maximum potential economic value (from an active regional perspective) of an integrated and 
cooperating CB region, as it denotes the maximum difference between the CB payoff and local payoff to mutual 
cooperation (and unilateral defection). In the same setting, the minimum potential value of mutual cooperation (and 
unilateral defection) across the border is then given by v1 – v0. NB: An active regional perspective here refers only to 
the active economic interactions across the border for the region’s own actors (on the average). 
  10become more economically integrated (insider interaction rates 
A
L f  and 
B
L f  decrease) the 
estimate of  ,
A
CC B f




− = , 
and conversely that  , and the CB threshold function can then be written as 
. Due to the specification of trust as being independent of culture, this 
specification is troublesome because it implies that agents in a high trusting society will always 
cooperate to a higher extent with agents from a bordering low trusting society that with members 
of the agent’s own society – regardless of the cultural distance between the two
, ()
BB





() [ 0 ; 1
kk k
CB C C gf f
−− =∈
11. This is not 
plausible and I therefore include a correction of the threshold for the passively engaged agent 
based on this agent’s social attachment to his own region. In this way, the passive agent’s 
perceived risk of cooperation is influenced by his mental distance, which is in line with 
theoretical studies on cooperation thresholds, i.e. see Marsh [1994]. Hence, the CB threshold of 
cooperation (for passively engaged CB interaction partners) is given by 
()
1
, (, ) [ 0 ; 1
i kk k
CB i C i C gf f
λ
λ
− −− =∈         ( 5 )  
where  i λ  is agent i’s mental distance to the bordering region –k (see section 5.4.3). As such, if 
the agent has a high mental distance, more trust is needed to cooperate when passively engaged. 
If the mental distance on the other hand is 0, agents cooperate to similar rules whomever they 
interact with. In this connection, I assume that  i λ =0 if agent i  has  actively chosen a CB 
interaction since the agent in his choice of where to interact already has taken his mental distance 
into account (see section 5.5.) 
 
4.3. Representing the Mental Map of Agents  
 
4.3.1. Regions, Social Identity, and Mental Distance 
Although agents are influenced by economic incentives in their choice of where to interact, 
their behavior is simultaneously motivated by their sense of self – or their social identity
12. The 
concept of social identity, here interpreted as the agent’s social frame of reference on a regional 
                                                 





. This implies that A has a higher general trust than B, which then implies that 
A
C f f > . However, if this is so agents in A will also cooperate to a much higher extent when faced with agents 
from B than with agents from their own region. 
12 This argument follows the idea that the economic actions of an individual are inseparable from how this 
individual understands herself and others socially. 
  11level, is introduced through a simple formalization of Hofstede’s mental map. Hence, each 
agent’s social identity is comprised by a collective part and an individual part, where the 
collective part reflects the collective societal (regional) values, and the individual part the agent’s 
individual values. As argued, social identity is a relative concept, and since I am primarily 
concerned with cultural evolution regarding cultural boundaries between groups (and not between 
individuals within groups), I simplify the concept of social identity such that this is understood as 
being the agent’s social attachment to the region he belongs to, relative to the bordering region. 
In this respect the social identity refers not only to the agent’s social attachment to her own 
region, but also as a reference point which distinguishes the agent from the bordering region. In 
this sense, the agent’s social identity may also be interpreted as a mental distance towards the 
other region consisting of a collective part (the general cultural distance between places) and an 
individual part (the agent’s own cultural distance). Moreover, as these distances may affect 
individual choices consciously or in ways the individual is not aware of, subscribing them to 
concepts of preferences seems inappropriate.  
 
4.3.2. Individidualist and Collectivistic Cultures 
Given the interpretation of social identity above, it is perfectly possible that an agent who 
otherwise is individually detached from his region can still be attached on a collective level, and 
thereby motivated not to interact across the border. This can be the case, for instance, if the 
collective mental distance to the other culture is high, and if the influence of the collective values 
on the agent’s social identity also is high. Whether the influence of the collective values is mostly 
conscious (i.e. enforced by a high degree of social punishment if one does not conform or do 
what is expected by the society) or unconscious (simply taken as an ‘objective’ value) is not 
really the issue here. The point is that different societies exhibit different degrees of influence 
from individual and collective values according to the socialization process. In the following I 
assume that the degree of influence from the individual and the collective mental distances on the 
agents’ mental maps are exogenously given and equal for all agents within a given region. This 
enables investigations of questions related to how the CB interaction structure between 
individualst and collectivist cultures evolves
13.  
                                                 
13 Of course, since these paramters are taken as given and assumed the same for all agents who belong to the same 
region, it poses a problem if we look at, say, how an individualistic and a collectivistic culture cross-interacts. This is 
due to the fact that changes in these parameters are not allowed. To endogenize the degrees of influence from the 
  12 
4.3.3. Specification of the Agent’s Social Identity 
Based on what has been argued in the sections above, I model the mental distance of a given 
agent, denoted  i λ , as being dependent on the agent’s individual distance towards the bordering 
culture, which I denote  i θ , and on the collective distance, denoted Θ . The mental distance of 
agent i in region k is then given by  
(1 )
kk k
iG i G ww λθ =− + Θ





















The parameter   denotes the power of influence on the agent’s mental distance from the 
collective distance whereas the term (1  denotes the influence from the agent’s individual 
distance. The term  , which is the simple average of all agents’ individual mental distances in 
region k, generally depicts the cultural border, or the regional mental distance, that exists from k 
to the other region. As such, it represents the region’s collective distance to the bordering region, 
and because of its influence on each agent’s social identity it thereby also reflects the institutional 
character of the border. In this sense, a high value of   reflects a culture more collectivistic 
than individualistic because the collective distance in this case has a relatively high influence on 
the agent’s overall mental distance. It should also be noted that due to the specification of the 
social identity, cultural distances between two regions are not necessarily symmetric. Nor are 










4.4. Choosing Places 
Once the border is open, agents have the possibility of crossing it. If the average payoff 
(which may be thought of as the agent’s expected payoff) within the agent’s own region,  L π , is 
larger than the average payoff of a cross-border interaction,  CB π , then the agent will choose a 
local interaction with a very high probability, but as  CB π  increases relative to  L π , the more likely 
                                                                                                                                                              
individual and collective aspect of the social identity, however, is non-trivial and would certainly increase the 
model’s complexity considerably. 
  13is the agent to interact across the border. Whether the agent finally crosses the border, however, 
also depends on the agent’s mental distance. The probability of a local interaction is given by  
1
Pr ( )
[1 ( , )] (1 )
k












        (7) 
where   and  , kA B = ε  close to 0 
The parameter   reflects the degree of influence from differences in payoffs across 
regions, and the agent’s mental distance towards the bordering culture, on his behavior. For 
simplicity, I assume that 
[0,1]
k wπ ∈
k wπ  is exogenous and equal for all agents who belong to the same region 
k. This formulation enables investigations on how CB structures between cultures motivated 
strongly by economic payoffs (i.e. more in line with Homo economicus behavior), and cultures 
influenced more by social attachments, will evolve. The function  (, )( 0 ; 1 ]
kk
LC B f ππ ∈  reflects the 
difference between  L π  and  CB π . For instance, if 
k
CB L
k π π −  reaches its maximum then the 
economic motivations for a CB interaction are strongest, i.e. (, ) 1
kk
LC B f ππ = .
14 Thus, as 
kk
CB L π π −  
goes to 0 so does (.) f . This formulation implies that even if the agent’s mental distance reaches a 
value of 0, which means that there is no culturally induced home bias, the agent will still be 
influenced by an economic home bias – even if 
k
CB L
k π π >
15. The reason for this assumption is the 
fact that despite a non-existing cultural home bias, one can still think of issues related to 
economic distances when crossing the border such as higher legal requirements, higher 













= ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
, such that  (, )( 0 ; 1 ]
kk
LC B f ππ ∈  for 
k
CB L
k π π >  (8) 
                                                 
14 In this case, the payoff related contribution to the probability of a local interaction choice is 0 
15 For practical reasons, since there is no available information as to what the average CB payoff is at the moment of 
border opening, this formulation poses a problem. For simplicity, I assume that  () ()
kk
CB B L B π τπ τ =  where  B τ  is the 
time of the border opening. From hereon,  
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+ ∑ B ,  τ τ ∀ >  
where  ()
k
act n τ  is the number of agents in k who most recently (at time 
s τ τ ≤ ) actively chose a CB interaction, and 
()
k
pas n τ  is the corresponding number of agents who most recent was engaged in a passive CB interaction. The 
variables   and  k
act d
k
pas d  are dummy variables equaling 1 if the agent in k most recently was engaged in an active or 
passive CB interaction (respectively), whereas  ()
k
i π τ  is agent i’s most recent cross-border payoff.  
  14Thus, since max( )
kk
CB L π π −  is the maximum possible difference between average CB payoff and 
average local payoff,  (.) f  simply describes the payoff difference in relation to the maximum 
difference possible. In this connection, the parameter  [0;1] δ ∈  can be interpreted as the strength 
of the economic home bias reflecting i.e. transport costs, technology differences, etc. More 
formally δ  is the degree to which differences in average payoffs across regions (relative to the 
maximum difference possible) affect the choice of where to interact, and can in this sense be 
interpreted as the economic distance between regions
16. 
 
4.4.1. Updating the Mental Map and Trust in Cross-Border Interactions 
As in the local game, the CB game generates either positive or negative experiences for the 
agents involved. Since trust is independent of culture both agents adjust their trust accordingly to 
equation (1) as in the local game
17. However, as the CB interaction implies a cultural 
confrontation between the agents, they also update their individual mental distance, θ , towards 
the bordering region. I assume that this parameter is updated in a similar fashion as trust. Hence, 
if an agent has a positive CB experience (xi  = 1 whenever a partner cooperates) the agent 
decreases his individual mental distance, and if an agent has a negative CB experience (xi = –1 
whenever a partner defects), the agent increases his individual mental distance. Following the 
update of trust, the update process of the agent’s individual identity takes the form  
, max min
,1 , m a x
()
1
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=−∆ − − ⎜⎟ ⎢ ⎥ −Θ ⎣ ⎦ ⎝⎠
    (9) 
As in the trust update function  max θ ∆  and  min θ ∆  specifies the maximum and minimum rate 
change of the agent’s individual mental distance. In addition, and for reasons related to the 
discussion under the trust update function, there is a built-in tendency to move faster towards, 
and slower away from the group average
18. This is meant to reflect the ‘stickiness’ of cultural 
distance due to societal conformity with respect to shared societal values. Just as the average 
                                                 
16 Thus, if  0 δ =  then the behavioral motivations influenced by pure economic considerations (payoffs) reach their 
maximum impact on actual behavior. Of course, the overall degree of this impact is determined by the parameter 
k wπ  
from equation (8). This means that the standard economic behavior of where to interact can be represented as a 
special case of this model if there is no cultural home bias ( 1
k wπ = ) as well as no economic home bias ( 0 δ = ).To 
be consistent one will in this connection also require that ε = 0. 
17 This is due to the fact that the concept of trust employed in the model is understood as generalized trust, and is 
therefore independent of cultural biases. 
18 For instance, if agent i’s experience is positive (xi = 1) the reduction of individual mental distance is smaller 
(bigger) if agent i’s mental distance level is below (above) the collective distance 
  15level of trust may reflect an underlying commonality of values, so may the collective mental 
distance to other cultures (and is probably more likely to do so). For instance, breaking, or not 
conforming, with collective values regarding the distance to other cultures may induce various 
types of social sanctions within one’s own culture. This concludes the model. 
 
5. Simulating the Model 
The study of complex systems by the usage of simulation techniques has in recent years been 
given considerable attention within several fields of the social sciences [Gilbert & Troitzsch, 
1999], and advocated by several researchers, i.e. see Axelrod [1997], Axtell [2000], Gilbert 
[1995]. It is often argued that simulation techniques offer alternative ways to investigate rather 
complex models, which perhaps cannot be solved analytically, but they also offer alternative 
ways to think of certain processes and problems [Gilbert, 1995]
19. Because of the mental map’s 
evolutionary nature employed in this model, and the model’s resulting degree of complexity, I 
have used an agent based simulation technique in the following analysis. The model has been 
implemented in the object oriented Pascal environment Delphi
20.  
 
5.1. General Assumptions and Considerations 
I look at two bordering regions denoted A and B. Each region’s population, nA and nB, is set 
equally large ( ). Initially the border is closed for interaction, but once opened 
agents have the possibility of interacting across the border. Games are assumed symmetric across 
regions with the following payoff structure: b = 15, c = 10, d = 5 and a = 1. The CB game differs 
in the sense that there are higher payoffs to mutual cooperation and unilateral defection. The 
minimum and maximum gains of these actions (relative to such actions performed locally) are set 
to 0.5 and 2 (  and  ). When agents are paired they play a PD game. The choice of 
action is based on the agent’s level of trust, t, relative to the threshold of cooperation. In this 
connection it is assumed that  . Trust is updated according to the agent’s experience of 
partner behavior such that  , as is the agent’s individual distance if engaged in a 
CB interaction (
500 AB nn ==
0 0.5 v = 1 2 v =
[0;1) t∈
[0.01;0.05] t ∆∈
[0.01;0.05] θ ∆∈ ). Given some historical process, I assume that two regions 
initially exist. Existing here refers to ‘cultural existence’ meaning that initial average values of 
                                                 
19 Some also employ the method because of basic dissatisfaction with the rational actor model [Axtell, 2000]. 
20 In order to get an overview of the program structure, please refer to the source code, which is available for 
download at www.ravneseti.subnet.dk/thesis/SourceCode.zip (if this link does not work, please email me at 
kbo@gmx.net).  
  16mental distances are given and higher than 0. Since the model has built-in tendencies for 
convergence in trust, either high level or low level trust regions will emerge (depending on the 
regions’ initial conditions on trust and thresholds of cooperation). In the following I will focus on 
the evolution of CB structures in the case of a high and a low trust region
21.  
 
5.2. First Simulation Results 
To get a better overview of the model and its properties, I run a single simulation, in which all 
parameters are identical across the regions. For simplicity, let the weights on payoff related 
motivations for the place of interaction be given by  , the weight on collective 
identities be given by  , and individual mental distances set such that 
 (both with a standard deviation of 0.2). In addition, the strength of economic 
home bias is set to 0.5 in both regions. The only difference I allow is the fact that initial trust 
levels are given such that 
0.5







A t =  and  0.475
B t =  (with standard deviations of 0.2). This 
means that there is a tendency for A to evolve into a high-trust region, and for B to evolve into a 
low-trust region. In order for this tendency to take effect, agents are not allowed to cross the 
border until simulation round 100. This corresponds to 50 ‘generations’ in each area where 1 
generation corresponds to 250 interactions among the 500 agents in each area
22. 
 
5.2.1. A Failure of Economic and Cultural Integration 
The first simulation shows a situation of integrational failure. Figure 5.2.1 and 6.2.2 depicts 
the evolution in cultural distance, trust, local interaction intensity, and fractions of local, CB and 
total cooperators in both regions, while figure 5.2.3 depicts evolutions in local and CB average 
payoffs for both regions. Looking at the evolution in the mental distance it can be seen that it is 
unaffected until simulation round 100, which is due to the fact that the border is closed. In the 
                                                 
21 The model will, under certain circumstances, give rise to some “trivial” cases. For instance, two low-trust regions 
will never integrate fully (although they may have periods with high CB interaction frequency) and two high-trust 
regions will always integrate (although this may take a very long time). It must be mentioned, however, that the 
model is not intended merely to give a binary answer as to whether a cooperating CB region emerges or not. 
Although this question is important and will be addressed in the following, the model is first of all intended as an 
early attempt to let culturally driven behavioral motivations take a major place in the modeling of cross-cultural 
economic choice, and secondly, to give some insights into the evolutionary process of such a framework. 
22 In this way, all agents (in principle) have been engaged in either an active or passive interaction. The reason for 
not letting 1 generation correspond to 500 interactions among 500 agents is the fact that both agents in an interaction 
update their individual level of trust, and, if the interaction is crossing the border, their mental distance. As such, 1 
interaction leads to 1 experience but for two agents. 
  17same time interval we also note, as expected, that trust increases in A while it decreases in B. 
When the border opens the cultural distance from A to B clearly increases, while it decreases 
from B to A. Thus, although the mental distances initially are symmetric (on the average), they 
quickly become asymmetric. This is caused by the high-trust nature of A and the low-trust nature 
of B. In this respect, because of the CB structure agents from B will have very big potential gains 
by shifting their economic activity to A, and as the border opens up this is exactly what is 
happening. Thus, due to the high distance between 
B
CB π  and 
B
L π  (see figure 5.2.3) a large fraction 
of agents in B engages actively in CB interaction, and because B is a low trust area, the gain of 
defection when interacting in A is too high relative to the general trust in B causing the vast 
majority to defect (see f_C,CB in figure 5.2.2). This generates a stream of negative CB 
experiences in A, which leads to an increase in the collective mental distance from A to B, 
A Θ , as 
well as to a drop in A’s regional trust.  
Due to the high general trust in A relative to B, trust in A is (initially) high relative to the gain 
of defection when faced with CB interacting B-agents. Thus, B-agents face a stream of positive 
CB experiences, despite the A-agents’ adjustment of the CB threshold according to equation (5). 
This leads to two effects. First, the general level of trust in B is increasing, and second, the mental 
distance from B to A,  , decreases (see figure 5.2.2). Because of the decrease in 
B Θ
B Θ , the 
fraction of active CB interacting B-agents increases even further, and since the gain of CB 
defection remains relatively high, the general trust in B is not high enough to induce enough 
cooperation with agents from A. Therefore, despite an increase in B’s CB cooperation (f_c,CB in 
figure 5.2.2), caused by A’s positive trust effect on B, and although the local cooperation in B 
increases even more (of the same trust related reasons), region A continues to have negative CB 
experiences on the average. As a result 
A Θ  continues to increase, which eventually effects the 
fraction of CB cooperators in A,  ,
A
CC B f , negatively (figure 5.2.1). In fact, because the increase in 
trust in B  is not fast enough,  ,
A
CC B f  eventually falls below 0.5, causing a minority of CB 
cooperators among A-agents. This clearly has a negative effect on region B since the average 
stream of CB experiences in this region then turns negative, which causes the CB structure to 
break trust in B instead of building it. In effect, region B stays a low trust region, and the two 
regions finally end up building stronger and stronger cultural borders towards each other. 
 
 
  18Figure 5.2.1: Cultural Evolution, Trust and Local/CB Cooperation in Region A 
Region A
























































trust mental dist. f_L
 
Note: As the border opens the mental distance towards B increases to a very high level. Trust decreases a little but 
picks up again as CB activity from B falls again. The fraction of CB cooperation, f_c,CB, decreases quickly as the 
mental distance increase. The high level of the total cooperation fraction, f_c, signals that most economic activity 
involves local agents. 
 
Figure 5.2.2: Cultural Evolution, Trust and Local/CB Cooperation in Region B 
Region B
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Region B





























Note: As the border opens the mental distance towards A decreases and trust increases. Also, the fraction of local and 
CB cooperation rises. However, as mental distance from A to B increases (figure 5.2.1), the mental distance towards 
A starts increasing, and trust decreases again leading to a fall in both local and CB cooperation. As the mental 
distance towards A continues to increase, economic activity is shifted back into B, and cooperation decreases again. 
The reason why local cooperation is much higher than CB cooperation is caused by the fact that the gain of local 
defection is much lower compared to the gain of CB defection. Thus, trust is not high enough to induce CB 
cooperation. 
 
  19We notice from figure 5.2.1 that although 
A Θ  rises quickly, and stays at a very high level, 
B Θ  
(figure 5.2.2) rises too, but at a much slower rate. The reason for this is the fact that although A’s 
overall defection rate towards B has increased (due to the increase of 
A Θ ), trust in A remains 
very high due to the region’s local interaction intensity (
A
L f  is close to 1 all the time). As a result, 
agents from A still cooperate to a fairly high extent when faced with B agents in passive CB 
interactions despite the high level of 
A Θ  (on average   after convergence in A). This 
implies that B agents continue to experience quite high levels of positive CB game outcomes, 
which slows the process of increasing the mental distance from B to A considerably. Since CB 
payoffs continue to be quite high in B of the same reasons, as seen in figure 5.2.3, it also slows 
the process of switching economic activity back into region B, which can be seen as 
, 0.41
A
CC B f =
B
L f  increases 
very slowly (see figure 5.2.2). 
 
Figure 5.2.3: Evolving Payoff Structures for Region A and B 


















































































Note: Initial CB payoffs in A are low but increase (as trust increases in B) until f_c,CB (figure 5.2.1) falls below 0.5. 
In B payoffs are initially very high, but decrease rapidly as the mental distance from A to B increase. Yet, CB payoffs 
in B converge to a level above the local average (due to the reproduction of high trust in A). In A CB payoffs 
converge to a level below local payoffs. Economic outcome averages are measured as simple regional averages in 
local or CB (both active and passive) payoffs. 
 
5.2.2. Economic Aspects of the Cross-Border Structure 
The reason why the rate of increase in local economic activity in B, 
B
L f  (after sim round 140), 
is lower than the rate of increase in B’s cultural distance to A, 
B Θ , is the fact that B’s economic 
incentives for CB interactions remain at a high level (i.e. see figure 5.2.3). In fact, since the 
  20border has not been culturally overcome and trust has not converged, the emerging CB structure 
has been skewed to the advantage of the low-trust region, B. This implies that B is not too far 
from the economic potential of an economically closed but high-trust region
23. The level of 
exploitation, however, is slowly being reduced due to B’s increasing cultural distance to A. As 
table 5.2.1 shows, area B reaches an average economic outcome of 7.830, which is significantly 
higher than what would be possible for a low-trust region in case of no CB possibility. In fact, if 
the border had remained closed, B would be in the vicinity of  6.411
B
L π = , which is close to the 
potential
24. In this sense, due to the CB structure, B raises its eco come around 22%, and 
although this increase only is made possible by A’s cooperative culture, the A region also gains 
from the CB structure since a large part of B’s economic activity becomes concentrated in A. In 
fact, nearly 40% of B’s economic activity takes place in A thereby raising the overall average 
outcome in A. Hence, instead of an average regional outcome in the vicinity of 8.878, the A 
region reaches an average outcome of 10.283, which is about 16% higher
nomic out
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k
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L π  
k
CB π   Local A Potential
* ctive  Passive Total 
A  0.999 0.001 0.394 8.878 3.583   10.283 8.867 0.004 1.412 8.918
B  0.606 0.394 0.001 6.411 9.983 3.885 3.934 0.012  7.830 6.427
CB  6.376 1.969 0.712 9.057 17.273
Note ese r o s sim  a  o si  r fte t
con nce (simulation round 800). The stated economic outcome a  ar ed c
A 
 
r a closed low-trust region. The potentials given in the table are obtained as averages for 
                                                
: Th
verge
esults were  btained a ulation verages ver 450  mulation ounds a r comple e model 
verages e obtain  as simple local, a tive CB 
or passive CB payoff averages across the whole region. Thus, the CB region figures are simple averages of area 
and B combined.  
*) In principle, the highest potential average outcome is 10 for a closed high-trust region, whereas 5 is the minimum
average outcome fo
converged closed high-trust regions (A), closed low-trust regions (B), and high-trust CB regions (CB). 
 
 
23 In principle the highest potential outcome of a closed high-trust region is 10 (due to the chosen payoff structure). 
However, because of the model’s parameter specifications the average outcome of such a region (when converged) 
lies in the neighborhood of 8.918, i.e. see the potentials given in table 5.2.1. 
24 Although the difference between 6.427 and 6.411 is a very small difference, it turns out to be significant. 
25 It should be noted that the percentages regarding the economic gain of the CB structure are a little overestimated 
for both regions. For region A this is because a significant fraction of agents from A (41% of the overall fraction of 
CB interactions of 0.395) continues to cooperate with defecting B agents, such that the general level of trust in A 
never reaches its maximum. Naturally this implies that local cooperation in A does not reach its maximum either. 
Hence, if there were no CB structure 
A
L π  would be higher than 8.878 (around the potential of 8.918), and thereby the 
actual regional gain in outcome due to the CB structure is more likely to be 15% and not 16%. Following the same 
argument for region B, trust levels are higher in this area than if there was no CB possibility. Therefore, 
B
L π  is 
underestimated as well. 
  21Thus, although the results above depict a clear failure of cultural integration, it can be discussed 
whether the economic integration is a failure too. The average outcome of the CB region is 
certainly less than its potential, but from an economic perspective everybody still gains on 
average. These gains, however, are merely caused by a generally increased interaction frequency 
due to the possibility of passive CB interactions with no loss of active economic activity. This 
means that although the number of interactions is the same per generation as it was before the 
border opening, agents have more sources of economic outcome than before because they can be 
engaged in active and passive interactions both locally and across the border. Hence, A gains 
from increased economic activity whereas B gains from exploiting the cooperative structure of  A. 
Hence, although economic output has grown in the area, the price has been a lock-in effect on a 
highly asymmetric CB structure, which effectively has caused the construction of even stronger 
cultural boundaries between places. As such, the task of overcoming the border has become 
harder than it was at the time when integration was attempted. 
 
5.3. The Emergence of a High-Trust Cross-Border Region 
There may be several different conditions which can increase the probability that a high-trust 
CB region emerges. The most obvious, for example, could be a reduction of the cultural distance 
from A to B, from B to A, or both. From the results above, however, there seem to be three major 
steps in the integrational process. First, as the border opens 
B
L f  decreases strongly causing a 
pressure on region A in terms of trust. Already at this point 
A Θ  increases and 
A t  decreases, 
whereas   decreases and 
B Θ
B t  increases. Second, as 
B t  increases, so does both local 
cooperation in B ( ,
B
CL f ) and B’s CB cooperation ( ,
B
CC B f ), which give rise to two effects.  
 
i.  As the openness of B increases (
B
L f  towards 0), the expected gain to local defection in B 
decreases, thereby reducing the risk of local cooperation. Hence,  ,
B
CL f  increases, which 
has a positive effect on trust in B. 
ii.  Although the level of trust in B is increasing fast (both due to cooperation from A and less 
local defection in B), the expected gain to defection in A remains quite high relative to the 
trust level in B, causing  ,
B
CC B f  to increase much slower than  ,
B
CL f  (see figure 5.2.2).  
 
Lastly, since the continuous CB defection from a large fraction of B agents still cause 
A Θ  to 
increase,  ,
A
CC B f  decreases, which eventually causes trust to be broken in B. This has a devastating 
effect in B  because most of B’s  economic activity at this time is located in A. Hence, the 
  22emerging trust breaking effects of the CB structure weighs more heavily on the general trust in B 
than the emerging positive trust effect in B  from the ongoing process of increasing local 
cooperation in the region. Therefore, reducing the cultural distance from B  to  A  will not 
necessarily result in the emergence of a high-trust CB region because such a reduction only 
sparks more CB interaction from B to A. What is required is some mechanism that can induce a 
fraction of CB interactors in B large enough to build regional trust, such that local cooperation in 
B as well as CB cooperation from B to A can be sparked, but small enough to avoid the mental 
distance from A to B to grow too much. Hence, reducing the mental distance from A to B would 
be more important than reducing the distance from B to A. Lowering the initial level of 
A Θ  could 
sustain a larger group of invading B agents for a longer period of time before the majority of 
passively CB engaged agents in A would start to defect and thereby cause trust breaking in B. The 
critical mass of trust could therefore be built in B, which eventually would offset the process of 
cultural border building from A to B.  
 
5.3.1. Overcoming the Border 
Based on the discussion above I ran a simulation similar to the previous, but with a reduced 
average cultural distance from A to B to 0.3. From figure 5.3.1 it is apparent that   increases 




CC B f  decreases 
quickly and falls below  ,
A
CL f  (figure 5.3.1), it does not reach an average consistently below 0.5, 
which would otherwise spark a trust breaking effect in region B. In other words,   remains 
small enough to continuously build trust in B by not affecting the CB threshold of cooperation of 
passively CB engaged A-agents beyond the critical point observed in the previous example. Thus, 




CC B f , 
we also note that the intensity of local interaction in A, 
A
L f , starts to decrease even though 
A Θ  is 
quite high
26. Eventually, as both   and 
A Θ
B Θ  goes to 0, and as 
k
CB L
k π π >  for both regions,  ,
k
CL f  
                                                 
26 This is caused by the fact that as trust in B increases, 
A
CB L
A π π −  also increases and becomes positive, meaning 
that there is an economic incentive for A to interact across the border. However, although 
A
CB L
A π π >  this does not 
mean that the majority of agents in A simply shift their economic activity to B because of the very high level of 
A Θ . 
In fact, the shift of economic activity from A to B follows the decline in 
A Θ , which is caused by an increasing 
fraction of CB cooperators in B. 
  23,
k
CC B f and   also converges towards the same level for both regions, and a symmetric, successful 
CB structure emerges.  
 
Figure 5.3.1: Cultural Evolution, Trust and Local/CB Cooperation in Region A 
Region A





























t, Mental Distance and Local Activity
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Note: The mental distance towards B increases but starts falling around round 201 as CB payoffs become bigger than 
local payoffs (see figure 5.3.3). Hence, the local interaction intensity, f_L, also declines. The fraction of CB 
cooperation, f_c,CB, is above local cooperation, f_c,L, but declines fast as the mental distance increases. Eventually, 
however, both local and CB cooperation converges towards the same level.  
 
Figure 5.3.2: Cultural Evolution, Trust and Local/CB Cooperation in Region B 
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Note: The mental distance towards A decreases and trust increases. As the mental distance from A to B increases the 
rates of change in these variables become smaller. The wild fluctuations in local interaction intensity are caused by 
small differences between local and CB payoff. The fractions of local and CB cooperation are initially are very 
small, but they quickly increase towards the same level as the general trust increases. 
  24As in the previous example, it can be seen from figure 5.3.1 and 6.3.2 that the high degree of 
local interaction intensity in A reproduces a high level of general trust in A – although trust is 
negatively affected by CB interacting B agents
27. 
Some large fluctuations in the intensity of local interaction in B occurs in the interval between 
simulation round 230 and 300 (see figure 5.3.2). These depict the strength of payoff related 
motives for CB interaction for agents in B. As 
B
CB π  has been larger than 
B
L π  since the border 
opening (figure 5.3.3), the increase in 
B t , as well as the falling rate of CB cooperation in A 
(figure 5.3.1), has finally leveled out this difference, which means that there exists a time in B 
where there is no payoff motivated influence for crossing the border. This causes some wild 
fluctuations in 
B
L f , but as trust continues to increase in B, 
B
CB π  eventually reaches a level higher 
than 
B
L π  again, and 
B
L f  starts to decrease again. Thus, in the end a high-trust CB region emerges, 
and the potential economic average of the CB structure, stated in table 5.2.1 is realized. 
 
































































Note: CB payoffs are initially low in A but high in B. As the mental distance from A to B increases, CB payoffs in B 
decrease, and as trust increases in B, CB payoffs increase in A. Eventually CB payoffs rise above local payoffs in A.  
                                                 
27 The positive effect on trust in B is much larger than the negative effect on trust in A. This is caused by the fact that 
the degree of local interaction intensity is much higher in A than it is in B. Since B-agents shift their economic 
activity to A they have positive experiences causing their trust level to rise. In this process, however, they defect 
most of the time causing negative experiences for the agents in A. But as the local interaction frequency in A is very 
high, agents in A encounter more cooperating A-agents than defecting B-agents (since   and  ).  1
A
L f ≈ 0
B
L f >
  256. A More General Model Analysis 
The simulations in section 5 have depicted processes of cross-cultural cooperation and 
integration, however, the broader picture given by the model, its properties and the underlying 
dynamic processes are not easily uncovered in this connection. For instance, I have looked at 
regions differing only with respect to their general level of trust, and considered only one case 
with differences in mental distance. It is therefore desirable to know what happens if other 
parameters of the model are varied and especially so if in an asymmetric way across cultures. In 
this connection, the model offers a broad range of possible areas of investigation, but due to 
constraints related to CPU availability, I found it necessary to reduce the analysis considerably by 
reducing the number of investigated parameters. Nevertheless, I undertook a quite computing 
intensive investigation over the parameter space stated in table 6.1.  
 
Table 6.1: Search Space of Investigated Parameters 
Parameter Search  Space 
k wπ   {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}
k
g w   {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}
k Θ   {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8}
 
Note: Since k = A, B this resulted 
in 3
44
2 = 1296 single simulations 
of which I ran 4 each. This yields 
a total of 5184 single simulations. 
 
To get a general overview of the three possible CB outcomes
28, the obtained averages in trust and 
mental distances from all final round simulations are stated in appendix A.  
 
6.1. Testing the Model 
It is clear that the simulations above have given certain insights about the model’s properties, 
however, the effects of some parameters are not clear. For instance, the probability of the 
emergence of a successful CB structure (high-high) depends negatively on  , but whether this 
is also the case for   is uncertain. On the other hand, it seems fair to argue that the success 
depends positively on the trust levels in both regions (
A Θ
B Θ
A t  and 
B t ).  
If one looks at the model concerning the economically vs. social identity related motivations 
for agent behavior (represented through the parameter
k wπ ), the effect is not clear. For instance, a 
                                                 
28 It should be mentioned that I have only discussed two different outcomes of the model. Either the cultural border 
will be overcome, and a high-trust CB region emerges, or the cultural border will not be overcome and a high-low 
trust CB region appears. But there is a third possibility – although it is less likely to occur. It might be that the CB 
structure results in a much stronger trust breaking process in A, such that a low-low trust CB region, with high 
cultural distances both from A to B and from B to A, emerges. 
  26high value of 
B wπ  will cause a larger fraction of B-agents to interact across the border. This will 
cause a powerful positive effect on trust in B, but at the same time a trust breaking effect in A and 
an increased mental distance from A to B.  Which effect is the larger, and how it will affect the 
CB structure is not clear. As regards to variations in 
A wπ , however, these are not likely to affect 
the success of the CB structure since economic motivations for high-trust areas to interact in low-
trust areas are small relative to the expected outcome in a local interaction.  
In the model, the mental distance of agents in collectivistic cultures is influenced to a high 
extent by the group average (the collectively shared values). This is not the case for 
individualistic cultures, in which the agents are influenced more by their individually held values. 
Although cultural influences are strongest when economic behavioral motivations are small, 
collectivist cultures are always more ‘sticky’ than individualistic cultures because changes in the 
collective distance towards the bordering culture are slower than changes in individual mental 
distances. Hence, as agents from B due to economic reasons are more likely to interact across the 
border than locally at the time of the border opening, and as the cultural distance from B to A in 
this process decreases fast (because of cooperation from A), a more individualistic culture in B (a 
low value of 
B
g w ) would speed up this process. Therefore, an increase in 
B
g w  is expected to play a 
role similar to a decrease in 
B wπ . Therefore, the effect of variations in 
B
g w   on the success of the 
CB structure is unclear. In region A, however, it must be the case that the slower the cultural 
adaptation in A to the defecting agents from B, the longer the process of trust building in B can be 
sustained. In this light, a collectivist culture in A (a high value of 
A
g w ) is likely to contribute 
positively to the probability that a high-trust CB region emerges. 
 
6.2. Model Estimates 
In order to analyze the model’s properties on the issues raised above I estimated a logit model 
using results from the 5184 single simulations. The dependent variable hh takes the value 1 if a 
high-high CB region emerges and 0 otherwise, and the explanatory variables used are 
A Θ , 
B Θ , 
A t , 
B t , 
A wπ , 
B wπ , 
A
g w , and 
B
g w  (all recorded at the time of the border opening for each 
simulation). The regression results are illustrated in table 6.2.1.
29  
                                                 
29 Several other models, including various types of variable interactions, were estimated. In this connection, most 
variable interactions came out insignificant, and the model presented here seemed to give the best brief overview of 
the model’s properties.  
  27 
Table 6.2.1: Logit estimates concerning the emergence of a high-trust CB region 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =       5184 
                                                  LR chi2(8)      =    3900.47 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -377.41089                       Pseudo R2       =     0.8379 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      hh |      Coef.   Std. Err.       z     P>|z|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CulDs_AB |   -65.6275   10.84486     -6.051   0.000      -86.88303   -44.37196 
CulDs_BA |   -6.32115   .5328673    -11.863   0.000      -7.365551   -5.276749 
 Trust_A |   33.70771   2.157172     15.626   0.000       29.47973    37.93569 
 Trust_B |  -14.75914   47.64133     -0.310   0.757      -108.1344    78.61615 
     wpA |    .075175   .2841814      0.265   0.791      -.4818104    .6321603 
     wpB |   4.808985   .3696941     13.008   0.000       4.084398    5.533572 
     wgA |   .6713193   .2880312      2.331   0.020       .1067885     1.23585 
     wgB |  -.7801931   .2837445     -2.750   0.006      -1.336322    -.224064 
   _cons |  -15.28075   2.764446     -5.528   0.000      -20.69896   -9.862532 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
6.3. Explaining the Model’s Properties 
As expected the cultural distance from A to B (CulDs_AB,
A Θ ) has the predominant negative 
effect on the success of a high-high CB region. We also note that although the cultural distance 
from B to A (CulDs_BA, ) plays a smaller role relative to the distance from A to B, its effect is 
significant. With respect to trust levels, the general trust in A at the time of the border opening 
(Trust_A) has, as expected, a highly significant positive effect on the CB outcome. Surprisingly 
enough the same is not true for the trust level in B (Trust_B). In fact, trust in B does not matter in 
itself for the success of the CB structure
B Θ
30. 
Concerning the degree of economic motivations for place of interaction (relative to the 
influence from the agent’s mental distance), it can be seen, as expected, that this parameter is 
insignificant for region A (wpA,
A wπ ), and therefore has no explanatory power over the success of 
the CB structure. The same parameter for region B (wpB,
B wπ ), however, is very significant and 
positive. There are two underlying processes that explains this sign. First, since a high reliance on 
economic motives for place of interaction means that a high fraction of B agents will interact 
across the border, it also means that these motives will loose their power quite fast as the distance 
between local and CB payoff averages is reduced. And second, since a higher economic 
motivation for CB interaction in B results in a faster rate of trust increase in B, it means that local 
                                                 
30 Further data analysis suggests that the answer lies in both the standard deviation and levels of trust at the time of 
the border opening. Here, trust levels in B are much more consistent relative to trust levels in A as the standard 
deviation of trust in A varies considerably more than it does in B. Part of the fact that trust does not matter in B can 
therefore most likely be ascribed to differing initial conditions. Further investigations of this, however, will not be 
undertaken here. 
  28payoffs increase rapidly in B (because trust increases fast relative to the expected gain of local 
defection, which causes local cooperation instead of defection). Combining these dynamics it 
becomes clear why a positive wpB increases the probability of success. A large wpB shifts a large 
fraction of B’s economic activity to A once the border opens. Thus, trust is built fast in B while 
only reducing it a little in A. Nevertheless, the cultural distance from A to B increases fast causing 
more and more A-agents to defect on B. However, as trust increases fast in B so does the B’s local 
average payoff. This means that the distance between 
B
CB π  and 
B
L π  is reduced, and as wpB is high 
for agents in B (economic motivations place of interaction), it also means that the economic 
impact on the choice of where to interact quickly looses its power over the choice of a CB 
interaction relative to a local interaction. Therefore, economic activity is shifted back into B, and 
this extends the process by which high regional trust in A can be reproduced (due to the high 
local interaction intensity in A), while keeping the mental distance from A to B on a sufficiently 
low level. 
Regarding individualistic and collectivist cultures it can be seen from the estimation results 
that the coefficient of wgA (
B
g w ) is positive and significant, while the coefficient on wgB (
A
g w ) is 
negative and significant. Thus, a high-high CB region is more likely to occur the more 
collectivist the high-trust area is, and the more individualistic the low-trust area is. While the 
explanation behind the positive impact of a collectivistic culture in the high cooperative region is 
clear, the reason behind the negative sign of wgB follows a line of arguments related to the 
explanation of the positive sign on wpB. Hence, an individualistic culture in B helps to speed up 
initial trust building in B since it implies a shift in economic activity from B to A. This cause the 
cultural distance from A to B to increase faster, and so does the fraction of CB defecting A-agents. 
However, since agents in B rely more on their individual mental distance towards A (rather than 
the collective distance), the increase in CB defection in A is taken faster into account in each CB 
interacting B-agent’s future choice of interaction place. This means, that as the fraction of CB 
cooperation in A decreases, B’s economic CB activity shifts more easily back into B than what 
would have been the case if the B region was a collectivistic culture. This naturally reduces the 
overall number of CB defecting B-agents and causes a reduction in the stream of negative CB 
experiences in A, which extends the time in which A’s mental distance towards B is kept low. 
 
  297. Conclusion 
In the sections above, cases of economic integration between high-trust and low-trust regions 
have been addressed. This has been done with a special emphasis on a broader understanding of 
borders than what is normally applied in such analyses, and their cultural aspects. In this 
connection, it has been argued that borders constitute important devices by establishing common 
points of reference to which people can relate themselves and others. Hence, they feed into the 
social identities of people. As such, the cultural aspect of the borders has been modeled by 
operationalizing the concept of social identity, which in this case has been narrowed to the way 
people understand themselves in relation to people from foreign cultures. In this sense, the final 
formalization of the border relates to people’s mental distance towards the bordering culture. The 
model is analyzed using agent-based simulation techniques. 
On a general level, simulations of the model reveal that cultural differences between regions 
can influence both the evolutionary process of economic integration, as well as the overall 
success of the integration, to a considerable extent. It suggests that the integrational success 
depends significantly (and in asymmetric ways) on mental distances between regions, on 
economically vs. culturally motivated behavior, and on collectivistic vs. individualistic characters 
of the regional cultures. More specifically, if two regions show signs of asymmetries regarding 
cultural distances, the model suggests that the degree and character of this asymmetry is not 
unimportant. A situation characterized by a high mental distance between a region with a well-
developed cooperative structure and a region where such a structure is lacking is much more 
likely to impede a successful integration than in a situation with the converse cultural context. 
Also, the probability of integrational success depends positively on the degree to which the high-
cooperative region is collectivistic (meaning that they are slow to adjust their held beliefs 
regarding the bordering region). This may also be interpreted as the more tolerant the high-
cooperative region is towards increased interaction from the bordering low-cooperative region, 
the higher the probability of a successful CB structure. The low-cooperative region, on the other 
hand, contributes positively to the success of the CB structure by exhibiting a more 
individualistic culture. This is due to the fact that such a culture exhibits a higher rate of 
adaptation with respect to building a more sound cooperative structure. 
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